Post by andrew on Jan 27, 2021 17:56:27 GMT -5
CinC of Bomber Command Sir Arthur Harris argued long and loudly against the "transportation plan" against French railways in aid of the upcoming 1944 landings in Normandy. After nearly a year of sustained bombing of German cities, notably "The Big City" - Berlin - and at great sacrifice too, such a diversion of effort, he argued, would make it all for naught, giving the German defences time to reorganize and recover. He was overruled. But before he was forced to make that diversion, he had time for one last shot at Berlin. It's difficult to say now whether it was simply a fit of pique that made him choose Berlin at that time. Surely he couldn't have believed one more raid on the most difficult target in Europe would tip the balance. In any event, on the night of 24/25 March 1944 it was on.
811 heavy bombers were dispatched. A maximum effort. Time over target would be 22:25 to 22:45 - twenty minutes in which over 800 bombers were to pass over the target. The route chosen was over the North Sea, across the Jutland peninsula to the Isle of Sylt, over the Baltic and north German coast on a route to Dresden as a decoy, with a final dog leg to bring them over Berlin. Unlike American bomber formations which maintained tight formations for protection, British skippers operated independently. They only had to follow the assigned route and arrive over the target at the determined time. This maximized their chances of survival as well as overwhelming local defences. It was called the bomber stream.
The trouble began almost immediately. On any mission there are aircraft which abort for any number of reasons. Crew sickness, mechanical failure, excessive icing, jammed guns - all were valid reasons to abort the mission and return to base. Aborting was not a free out, however. The mission was not credited to the crew, and if a skipper had too many he might be classified as "Lacking Moral Fibre" (LMF) and permanently disgraced. Of the 811 aircraft dispatched, no fewer than 53 aborted, an unprecedented 6.5 %. Propaganda to the contrary, Berlin was not a popular target. It was difficult to reach, heavily defended The last raid to the area, to Leipzig in fact, a few weeks earlier had been a complete disaster. And so an unusually high number of skippers opted to risk demotion and disgrace rather than make that trip again.
The technique of night navigation and bombing in blackout conditions was a complicated procedure. Navigators were briefed before an op with current, known, meteorological conditions, but those could change over the many hours of flying, and so many specialist crews were designated as "wind finders". By careful observation of their "Gee" radio beacon signals, their drift could be determined and prevailing winds calculated. This while barreling onward through the night at nearly 200 mph. Their calculations were sent back to base, which averaged the results and sent out a strong broadcast with revised met conditions. And that is where the second problem arose. Before reaching the Danish coast navigators began reporting winds from the north in excess of 120 and even 130 mph. It was unheard of. Many doubted their calculations, downgraded their estimates and sent those back. The met office shook their heads, revised the estimates downward again, and broadcast a now hopelessly incorrect met report. And still they barreled on through the night, drifting unknowingly ever southward. By the time the stream crossed the coast they were already thirty miles south of track.
It was at this point that many crews realized things had gone awry and attempted to get back on schedule. It was like hitting a sudden fog or snow squall on the highway. Some carry on, some slow down, some pull over, and no one knows what anyone else is doing. The bomber stream came apart. German radar began to identify individual aircraft and vector night fighters onto them. By good fortune, however, most night fighters were patrolling well to the south and could not make headway into the teeth of the wind. Relatively few bombers fell to interception this night. The flak crews, however, had a field day. Many aircraft were forced by the winds to fly over heavily defended areas they were trying to avoid. The first ship fell to radar-predicted flak over the Kiel Canal.
Some arrived early over the target, before the pathfinders, and began a series of time-wasting zig-zags, at great risk. Many crews flew right past Berlin without spotting it, not realizing their mistake until the fireworks erupted behind them. Some jettisoned their bombs and ran for home, some looked for another target, and a few tried to fight their way back to the target at a ground speed of about 40 or 50mph directly into the wind. The flak claimed many more in such conditions.... The target marking, unsurprisingly, was a complete failure, with markers dropped far and wide, being immediately swept south by the winds. In the end, so widely scattered was the stream, 126 towns and villages reported being bombed. Ironically, because of a new defensive system of phosphorus fires ignited around Berlin, the purpose of which was to silhouette bombers against the clouds for the night fighters lurking above them, most crews reported the raid as a resounding success.
72 heavy bombers were lost on this night, 9.1% of the force dispatched - a loss rate more than twice the supportable amount. At a debriefing the following morning one navigator recalled, "That was the first time I ever heard the words 'jet stream'".
RAF losses are plotted on the attached map - all well south of their assigned route...
811 heavy bombers were dispatched. A maximum effort. Time over target would be 22:25 to 22:45 - twenty minutes in which over 800 bombers were to pass over the target. The route chosen was over the North Sea, across the Jutland peninsula to the Isle of Sylt, over the Baltic and north German coast on a route to Dresden as a decoy, with a final dog leg to bring them over Berlin. Unlike American bomber formations which maintained tight formations for protection, British skippers operated independently. They only had to follow the assigned route and arrive over the target at the determined time. This maximized their chances of survival as well as overwhelming local defences. It was called the bomber stream.
The trouble began almost immediately. On any mission there are aircraft which abort for any number of reasons. Crew sickness, mechanical failure, excessive icing, jammed guns - all were valid reasons to abort the mission and return to base. Aborting was not a free out, however. The mission was not credited to the crew, and if a skipper had too many he might be classified as "Lacking Moral Fibre" (LMF) and permanently disgraced. Of the 811 aircraft dispatched, no fewer than 53 aborted, an unprecedented 6.5 %. Propaganda to the contrary, Berlin was not a popular target. It was difficult to reach, heavily defended The last raid to the area, to Leipzig in fact, a few weeks earlier had been a complete disaster. And so an unusually high number of skippers opted to risk demotion and disgrace rather than make that trip again.
The technique of night navigation and bombing in blackout conditions was a complicated procedure. Navigators were briefed before an op with current, known, meteorological conditions, but those could change over the many hours of flying, and so many specialist crews were designated as "wind finders". By careful observation of their "Gee" radio beacon signals, their drift could be determined and prevailing winds calculated. This while barreling onward through the night at nearly 200 mph. Their calculations were sent back to base, which averaged the results and sent out a strong broadcast with revised met conditions. And that is where the second problem arose. Before reaching the Danish coast navigators began reporting winds from the north in excess of 120 and even 130 mph. It was unheard of. Many doubted their calculations, downgraded their estimates and sent those back. The met office shook their heads, revised the estimates downward again, and broadcast a now hopelessly incorrect met report. And still they barreled on through the night, drifting unknowingly ever southward. By the time the stream crossed the coast they were already thirty miles south of track.
It was at this point that many crews realized things had gone awry and attempted to get back on schedule. It was like hitting a sudden fog or snow squall on the highway. Some carry on, some slow down, some pull over, and no one knows what anyone else is doing. The bomber stream came apart. German radar began to identify individual aircraft and vector night fighters onto them. By good fortune, however, most night fighters were patrolling well to the south and could not make headway into the teeth of the wind. Relatively few bombers fell to interception this night. The flak crews, however, had a field day. Many aircraft were forced by the winds to fly over heavily defended areas they were trying to avoid. The first ship fell to radar-predicted flak over the Kiel Canal.
Some arrived early over the target, before the pathfinders, and began a series of time-wasting zig-zags, at great risk. Many crews flew right past Berlin without spotting it, not realizing their mistake until the fireworks erupted behind them. Some jettisoned their bombs and ran for home, some looked for another target, and a few tried to fight their way back to the target at a ground speed of about 40 or 50mph directly into the wind. The flak claimed many more in such conditions.... The target marking, unsurprisingly, was a complete failure, with markers dropped far and wide, being immediately swept south by the winds. In the end, so widely scattered was the stream, 126 towns and villages reported being bombed. Ironically, because of a new defensive system of phosphorus fires ignited around Berlin, the purpose of which was to silhouette bombers against the clouds for the night fighters lurking above them, most crews reported the raid as a resounding success.
72 heavy bombers were lost on this night, 9.1% of the force dispatched - a loss rate more than twice the supportable amount. At a debriefing the following morning one navigator recalled, "That was the first time I ever heard the words 'jet stream'".
RAF losses are plotted on the attached map - all well south of their assigned route...
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