Post by andrew on Jan 6, 2021 18:24:38 GMT -5
Let us suppose for a moment that the Pearl Harbor operation had gone exactly to plan: The declaration of war was delivered on time and a significant proportion of American naval aviation assets were destroyed or crippled. Thus, Japan is given the time it thinks it needs to construct its unassailable defence perimeter and is able, it believes, to sue for peace on favourable terms (or force the allies to sue for peace).
I suggest it was always a fantasy. Firstly, although much is made of its late delivery, I believe the timing of the declaration of war against the US changed nothing. A surprise attack is a surprise attack. Making it "legal" by giving a few moments or hours notice would do nothing to soften the outrage of the attacked. In fact, it might even make it worse. Secondly, even if American striking power was entirely crippled, the only effect it would have had would be to delay the inevitable counterattack. There was a Germany-First doctrine in place anyway (which, by the by, is a pretty darn good indicator of just what American planners felt about Japanese capabilities). All of that vast fleet that overwhelmed Japan in the latter years of the war was laid down BEFORE Dec 7, 1941. So whether the US counterstrike happens in August of 1942 or August of 1943 matters not at all in the end; the result would have been the same. Japanese expectations that they could force the US to make peace were never realistic no matter how successful the raid was or was not. And, to my mind, the real flaw in the plan was the surprise nature of it, because nothing is so apt to make someone fight really hard and be unforgiving as sucker-punching him.
And now to the man who planned it. There was this fixation - and it wasn't just with Yamamoto; he just happened to be in charge - with meeting the American fleet in battle and destroying it decisively in one great battle. Yet, the more successful the Pearl Harbor operation was, the less likely this event would prove to be. Far better, methinks, to have let the Americans attempt to mount a naval rescue of the Philippines and destroy them in local waters. It was already part of the American war plan anyway, and everybody knew it. Further, surface engagements during the first year of the war before US technology decisively overtook Japanese capabilities demonstrate a marked Japanese tactical superiority. If there had been a grand showdown in the western Pacific in the spring of 1942 between the US and the Combined Fleet, I believe the Japanese would have emerged the victor, the Philippines would still have surrendered, and the conditions Japan supposed would be required to force a peace would have been achieved.
Instead, Yamamoto opted for a highly risky adventure which, whether it succeeded or failed, was sure to so anger the US that they would never make peace. That's not good general-ing (or admiral-ing) IMO.
Change my mind.
I suggest it was always a fantasy. Firstly, although much is made of its late delivery, I believe the timing of the declaration of war against the US changed nothing. A surprise attack is a surprise attack. Making it "legal" by giving a few moments or hours notice would do nothing to soften the outrage of the attacked. In fact, it might even make it worse. Secondly, even if American striking power was entirely crippled, the only effect it would have had would be to delay the inevitable counterattack. There was a Germany-First doctrine in place anyway (which, by the by, is a pretty darn good indicator of just what American planners felt about Japanese capabilities). All of that vast fleet that overwhelmed Japan in the latter years of the war was laid down BEFORE Dec 7, 1941. So whether the US counterstrike happens in August of 1942 or August of 1943 matters not at all in the end; the result would have been the same. Japanese expectations that they could force the US to make peace were never realistic no matter how successful the raid was or was not. And, to my mind, the real flaw in the plan was the surprise nature of it, because nothing is so apt to make someone fight really hard and be unforgiving as sucker-punching him.
And now to the man who planned it. There was this fixation - and it wasn't just with Yamamoto; he just happened to be in charge - with meeting the American fleet in battle and destroying it decisively in one great battle. Yet, the more successful the Pearl Harbor operation was, the less likely this event would prove to be. Far better, methinks, to have let the Americans attempt to mount a naval rescue of the Philippines and destroy them in local waters. It was already part of the American war plan anyway, and everybody knew it. Further, surface engagements during the first year of the war before US technology decisively overtook Japanese capabilities demonstrate a marked Japanese tactical superiority. If there had been a grand showdown in the western Pacific in the spring of 1942 between the US and the Combined Fleet, I believe the Japanese would have emerged the victor, the Philippines would still have surrendered, and the conditions Japan supposed would be required to force a peace would have been achieved.
Instead, Yamamoto opted for a highly risky adventure which, whether it succeeded or failed, was sure to so anger the US that they would never make peace. That's not good general-ing (or admiral-ing) IMO.
Change my mind.
